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The final years of the USSR and the person of its president M. Gorbachov are the focus of nu-
merous Russian researches connected with history, politics, economics and other fields of so-
cial science. This topic also has attracted a great deal of attention from researchers in Western 
countries and Japan. The Gorbachov epoch is viewed in a very particular was in in Japan: the 
former Soviet president is very popular up to the present among people and scholars and he 
was supported by the Japanese politicians and authorities because of his ‘perestroika’ course. 
In recent years the historical period from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s 
is being reconsidered in Russian social science, especially due to the 25th anniversary of the 
USSR’s collapse. This article aims to cover these events as they were seen by Japanese diplo-
mats who became the witnesses of the dramatic transformations in our country.
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Recent years have demonstrated an explosion of scientific interest in the history of 
the USSR, more specifically, the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In modern Rus-
sian historiography, topics associated with the final years of the USSR, the collapse of this 
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great power, and formation of the Russian Federation has drawn the focused attention of 
historians, sociologists, economists, publicists and journalists; the memoirs of partakers 
in those events are being published1. Japanese Sovietology and Russian studies maintain 
interest in the recent history of the USSR and Russia, especially the period of Gorbachev’s 
reforms and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As early as the 1990s, the well-known Russia 
experts Vada Haruki, Kimura Hiroshi, and Simotomai Nobuo have made contributions 
to the field. The monograph of Ishigooka Ken (a journalist and professor at Nihon Uni-
versity) The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (‘ソ連崩壊 1991‘, Tokyo, 1998) provided 
a detailed historical overview of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, archetypal 
for Sovietology and Russian studies in Japan, which tend to qualify manifestations of crisis 
in the Soviet economy, striving for independence by the national elites, and rows between 
political groups within the Communist party as major reasons for the collapse of the So-
viet Union. As a rule, little attention is paid to the cultural issues, everyday life, involve-
ment of foreign actors in the process of the USSR’s disintegration, whereas the crisis in 
domestic policy and economy is regarded by Japanese experts as a backbone of power and 
the degradation of statehood in the USSR.
The author of this paper focuses on the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
viewed by the diplomats in service of the Embassy of Japan in Moscow from the late 1980s 
to the early 1990s, namely the memoirs of Edamura Sumio, Ambassador of Japan to the 
USSR and the Russian Federation (How the Empire Collapsed: Memoirs of Ambassador of 
Japan in Moscow, 1990–1994) and Sato Masaru, analyst of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japan (The Self-Destructing Empire). The study of these sources enables us (1) to assess 
the Japanese vision of crisis phenomena in the USSR in the context of changing policy 
towards our country during the collapse of the Soviet statehood; (2) to identify the ‘dis-
persed’ ideas, following M. Foucault’s concept [1, p. 51, 92–95, 253], as it relates to a critical 
stage of Russian history (it can be noted preemptively that the assessments of S. Edamura 
and M. Sato are ‘trivial’ and common to Japanese Sovietology and Russian studies, and this 
make them interesting as a subject of imagology and history of ideas reflected in shaping 
the image of Russia and its history in Japan); (3) to analyze, upon a specific material, how 
the history of the ‘Empire’s’ collapse is treated in Japanese literature. To achieve the above 
goals, two sources were selected, which formed the basis for identifying the existent ideas 
in Japanese literature and social mind and influenced directly the formation of Russia 
policy in the early 1990s.
Edamura Sumio: How the Empire Collapsed: 
Memoirs of Ambassador of Japan in Moscow, 1990–1994
The book of Sumio Edamura, former Ambassador of Japan to the USSR and then the 
Russian Federation between 1990 and 1994, took a critical standpoint in describing life in 
the Soviet Union. At the same time, it cannot be argued that the author deliberately cre-
1 A number of recent prominent studies on this topic can be mentioned: Yanik A. A. The history 
of modern Russia: the origins and lessons from the last Russian modernization (1985–1999) (M., 2012), 
The year of 1990: the experience of studying recent history, in 2  volumes (ed.: I. Prokhorov, M., 2011), 
The collapse of the USSR: documents and facts (1986–1992), in 2 volumes (ed.: S. M. Shakhray, M., 2016); 
Bashkirova V., Solovyev A., Dorofeev V. The heroes of the 90’s. People and money. Recent history of capitalism 
in Russia (M., 2012); Gaydar E. T. The demise of the Empire. Lessons for modern Russia (M., 2006), etc. 
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ates a negative image of Soviet (and post-Soviet) society. Edamura’s position was largely 
shaped by the publication (1951) of a well-known American political scientist, diplomat 
and Russia expert George F. Kennan, who argued that the internal collapse of the social-
ist system was inevitable [2, p. 31; 3, p. 151–152]. S. Edamura had no expertise in Russian 
studies and was appointed as Ambassador to Moscow on his return from service in Indo-
nesia [2, p. 13–14]. When aware of the upcoming appointment, he took a careful study of 
the internal political situation: the diplomat went to the USSR fully aware that the changes 
taking place in the country were of great importance for international politics. 
Before leaving for the Soviet Union, S. Edamura delivered a lecture at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, in which he stated his 
opinion for the main reasons for the changes observed in the USSR: 1. crisis of the social-
ist system; 2. economic stagnation. He especially emphasized the social inequality in the 
USSR, where ‘the Soviet people got used to poverty in conditions of ‘equality’, rather than 
to progress under conditions of competition‘ [2, p. 18]. The Ambassador noted the special 
importance of the changed milestones of the Soviet leaders, who strived for ‘universal hu-
man values’ by introducing the policy of ‘perestroika’ and ‘new thinking’. S. Edamura spoke 
as a man of the Western world, an advocate of liberal democracy and market economy, 
who took this system of values as the true and the only for all peoples. In the same histori-
cal period, Japan was criticized by American and European economists, sociologists and 
political scientists for its unique economic system (a non-market market economy with a 
high level of state regulation and ‘crony capitalism’) and the functioning of its democratic 
institutions (the ‘Iron Triangle’ of the current electoral system) [4]. However, S. Edamura 
omitted this complex discourse from his memoirs and presented Japan as a country of 
a developed market and democracy, which was opposed to the inefficient Soviet social-
ist system. The same assessments still persist in Japanese public opinion of today, which 
means that this idea is anchored in perceptions and the historical image of the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union has become a rigid one. 
S. Edamura paid special attention to illustrating the economic stagnation in the USSR 
through social and everyday narratives as witnessed by foreign diplomats. For instance, 
one of his colleagues, a diplomat from Indonesia, during his visit to the Soviet Union 
could nowhere, as he said, order a salad, which in the Soviet catering meant just cucum-
bers and tomatoes. Another acquaintance of S. Edamura was shocked by the fact that the 
Soviet soap did not foam. The third one was surprised that all Muscovites, when going to 
their offices, carry shopping bags in addition to their briefcases [2, p. 20]. These narratives 
interested S. Edamura and from his point of view they showed the aggravation of econom-
ic stagnation in the USSR. Accordingly, when moving to his place of service in Moscow, 
he had certain expectations as to what he would have to face in the country of destination. 
Describing his arrival in the Soviet capital, he further expands the theme of distress and 
despondency in the USSR. He sees the capital as dull and colorless, and the sight of the 
fire in the fireplace at the embassy residence wrenched him from within [2, p. 36–38]. It 
should be noted that S. Edamura was appointed Ambassador to Moscow on the eve of the 
first visit of the Soviet leader to Japan and largely with the aim of preparing this visit, in 
the context of adjusting the political line of Tokyo towards the USSR (in 1989, the Japanese 
government formulated a new ‘balanced equilibrium‘ concept intended to boost bilateral 
relations and promote them to a new level). The appointment of this experienced diplo-
mat coincided with a period of reforms and instability in the USSR.
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S. Edamura believed that the reforms launched by the government of M. S. Gorbachev 
and the end of the Cold War announced in the course of the meeting of presidents of the 
USA and the USSR in Malta in December 1989, caused global-scale consequences in all 
regions [2, p. 24]. At the same time, he was skeptical about the policy of ‘new thinking’, 
since he did not observe fundamental changes in the Soviet system and in internal policy. 
This comes off as somewhat inconsistent, probably due to the fact that the gist of the So-
viet reforms remained unclear for the Japanese diplomat. Moreover, conflicts arose when 
speaking about changes in foreign policy: S. Edamura regarded the course of E. A. She-
vardnadze, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, as the most tangible confirmation 
of changes. He wrote: ‘The time has come when Soviet foreign policy, previously protected 
by the myth of its infallibility, is now mercilessly criticized by its own Minister of Foreign 
Affairs’ [2, p. 67]. S. Edamura viewed Shevardnadze’s statements positively and believed 
that Japanese diplomacy had been given a great opportunity to defend its state interests. 
Apparently, the ambassador of Japan did not notice changes in domestic policy but con-
sidered changes in the USSR foreign policy to be substantive. 
The attitude to the ‘territorial issue’, which was of the foremost interest to the Japanese 
party under the scope of Soviet diplomacy, was considered by S. Edamura as a barometer 
of the democratic atmosphere in the Soviet government. He mentioned discussions with 
representatives of the Soviet intellectual circles held between 1990 and 1991, which dem-
onstrated their willingness to listen to the arguments of the Japanese party. The diplomat 
emphasized the fact that under expanding contacts with the Soviet government, parlia-
ment and mass media in 1991, prior to the visit of M. S. Gorbachev to Japan, both he and 
the Embassy staff had the impression that ‘opinions on the territorial issue have not got 
more rigorous’ [2, p. 121]. It is obvious that in the new reality, the Japanese diplomatic mis-
sion got the opportunity to expand contacts with representatives of Soviet society. 
However, it is also clear that these contacts were mostly sought by representatives of 
the Soviet public, which were disposed to Japan and more loyal to the Japanese territorial 
claims, while the position of the USSR leader on this issue constantly eluded the Japanese 
Ambassador. Ahead of the visit of M. S. Gorbachev to Japan, the Japanese Embassy at-
tempted to hold informal talks with the Soviet leader, resorting to the ‘nemawashi’ prin-
ciple (literally, ‘digging around the roots‘ — preliminary coordination of positions) but 
Japanese diplomats and politicians failed to find the proper line [2, p. 124–125].
The Ambassador of Japan gave an ambiguous estimate of M. S. Gorbachev’s person-
ality. The President of the USSR appeared an outstanding person to him: ‘His name will 
remain in the history as the name of an outstanding political leader of the second half of 
the twentieth century. However, a powerful historical current can occur, which can not be 
governed by a single person’ [2, p. 33]. Thus, M. S. Gorbachev is viewed by S. Edamura as a 
person, who appeared at the right time but unable to manage alone historical processes in 
the USSR launched by himself — like a genie out of the bottle.
Further, Ambassador Edamura underlined that ‘Gorby’, as he was called in the Amer-
ican and Japanese press, was incredibly popular in Japan as a leading figure in world poli-
tics, and many Japanese politicians arriving to the USSR desired to meet him [2, p. 41]. On 
the other hand, he pointed out the unpredictability of the Soviet leader. To illustrate this 
feature, he cited the case related to the presentation of credentials, a formal event, during 
which the President of the USSR arranged private talks with the Ambassador of Japan and 
then and there the dates of Gorbachev’s visit to Japan were announced [2, p. 57]. Accord-
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ing to S. Edamura, the unpredictability of the Soviet leader was manifested most vividly 
in the course of his official visit to Japan in April 1991, when he left the car in Nagasaki, 
in violation of the Protocol, and went out to communicate with the people [2, p. 133–134, 
140–141]. This action was not coordinated with the Japanese security service and caused 
their resentment, but at the same time, it increased the popularity of the Soviet President 
in the eyes of the Japanese public. In his memoirs, S. Edamura reiterated that the Soviet 
President had charisma and charm, but actually he was a Kremlin leader, rather than the 
focal point of democratic forces in the country [2, p. 110–111]. According to the Japanese 
diplomat, Gorbachev’s position was one of the reasons for the increasing popularity of 
B. N. Yeltsin, who, on the contrary, sought to communicate the people directly and posi-
tioned himself as a people’s leader. 
Here, the author brings readers to realize the fact that the Soviet system was doomed 
to collapse due to the inability of the President, even the most open to the outside world, 
to lead the masses. However, a different context can be perceived, too — since the govern-
ment of the Russian Federation intended to pursue separate policy and negotiations with 
Japan, the Japanese establishment made a bid on B. N. Yeltsin’s team in 1991and lost its 
interest in M. S. Gorbachev. 
S. Edamura paid much attention to the events of August-December 1991. He found 
confirmation for the ideas reflected in the theoretical works of Western experts dedicated 
to the life of ‘empires’, since he regarded the USSR as such. For example, he mentioned the 
book ‘Invertebrate Spain‘ by Jose Ortega y Gasset, the valued Spanish philosopher, where 
the main reason for the collapse of the Roman Empire and Spanish colonial power is seen 
as the loss of ideological and cultural attractiveness of the metropolis, which created a 
‘project of living together‘ [5, p. 16]. S. Edamura draws an analogy with the situation in 
the Soviet Union by comparing between the ‘degradation‘ of Castile in the Spanish Empire 
and the communism losing its appeal in the eyes of many peoples that lived on the USSR 
territory [2, p. 100–101]. Consequently, in the above-mentioned presentation the former 
Japanese Ambassador brought the readers to the idea of the inevitable collapse of the 
Soviet Union based on the existing world historical experience, which, from the point of 
view of S. Edamura, was realized by the Western community in the early 1990s. 
Despite the fact that throughout the entire text dedicated to his service in the USSR, 
S. Edamura speaks of the instability of the political system, the moves and vagrancy in the 
power structures of the Soviet state, he flew away to Tokyo for vacation in August 1991, 
which raises the question, whether the Japanese diplomat assessed correctly what was 
happening in the country. Already on August 19, after the appearance of media commu-
nications on the initiated attempt of coup d’etat in Moscow, the Ambassador had to come 
back promptly to the Embassy [2, p. 161–162]. On his return to Moscow, S. Edamura not-
ed the rather subdued mood among the citizens. At the same time, according to his testi-
mony, foreign diplomats could not have a stake in the situation and persons involved, and 
thus took the position of observers. At that same time, when interviewed on 20 August, 
the Ambassador of Japan, with reference to the official position of Prime Minister Kaifu 
Toshiki, questioned the legality and constitutionality of the coup undertaken by GKChP 
(State Committee of the State of Emergency). The Tokyo position consisted in condemna-
tion of the putsch and support of B. N. Yeltsin [2, p. 169]. Therefore, the Ambassador, as an 
official, recognized the only option to resolve contradictions in the USSR — the coming 
to power of ‘defenders of democracy‘ headed by B. N. Yeltsin. He described coup leaders 
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as inconsistent: ‘they don’t have the guts to do what intended’ [2, p. 172]. According to the 
Japanese Ambassador, M. S. Gorbachev was rescued by his policy of ‘perestroika‘ launched 
a few years earlier, thanks to which the Soviet people did not turn against the President in 
favor of the GKChP [2, p. 176].
S. Edamura believes that after the failure of the August coup in 1991, the USSR was 
doomed to collapse. The Japanese diplomat paid special attention to the new status of 
M. S. Gorbachev and wrote that during the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR 
on August 23, the President of the USSR ‘did not speak as vividly as before’ [2, p. 181]. 
S. Edamura watched this session on television and saw the ‘humiliation’ of M. S. Gor-
bachev, when B. N. Yeltsin, in capacity of the President of the Russian Republic, made him 
acknowledge ‘that his “blindness” had led to tragic consequences’[2, p. 182], i.e., to the 
coup d’etat and the need to ban the Communist party. The Ambassador of Japan called this 
session a historic event and considered it as a start of the USSR’s demise [2, p. 182] and a 
turning point when B. N. Yeltsin began to play first violin, despite Gorbachev’s attempts to 
keep the established image and stay dignified.
In the autumn of 1991, the Japanese Embassy intensified its links with élites in the 
national republics: for example, S. Edamura established personal contacts and informa-
tion exchange with A. Akaev, head of Kyrgyzstan. Separate negotiations with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR were initiated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
established successfully governmental relations with the republic leadership of Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In autumn, agreements with the governments of the for-
mer Baltic republics were concluded. Immediately after the coup, S. Edamura, together 
with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Saito Kunihiko, visited B. N. Yeltsin in the White 
House, and, in early September, R. I. Hasbulatov visited Japan with a personal message 
from the President of the Russian Federation.
In bilateral relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan tended to play two 
camps — to develop links with the RSFSR and retain the established contacts with the 
Soviet leadership. This suggests that the Japanese strategy towards the Soviet at that time 
considered the capacity of the all-Union government structures as a still-relevant issue. 
This suggestion is proved by the announcement of a new foreign policy concept in relation 
to the USSR and the RSFSR, i.e., ‘Nakayama’s Five Principles’, which involved intensified 
negotiations with the Republican elites, against the legitimate status of the Soviet Union 
as the central all-Union government [2, p. 187; 6]. S. Edamura emphasized that the funda-
mental point of this concept consisted in establishing links Japan — Soviet Union, rather 
than Japan — Russia. Japan gave priority to the ‘territorial issue‘, focusing on the statement 
that its resolution ‘would facilitate the admission of the Soviet Union into the world com-
munity’ [2, p. 189]. Thus, under conditions of tremendous changes and instability in our 
country, the Japanese party sought new ways to attract attention and resolve territorial 
disputes in their favor, and this approach continued until 1993; i.e., after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the establishment of the new Russian government, when the Japanese 
party would exert serious targeted pressure to settle the territorial disputes [7, p. 51–53].
Moreover, the Ambassador of Japan wrote in such a manner as if the Soviet Union 
had never been accepted by the world community up to that time point, which raises 
several obvious questions — how, in this case, the USSR managed to represent one of the 
global poles throughout the previous forty years, what should be considered as ‘world 
community‘, and whether this specific bilateral issue could affect the international politi-
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cal balance of power on a global scale. Undoubtedly, this phrase reflects the ideological 
guidelines of the author and his circle. However, it also contains a key characteristic of 
the USSR from the point of view of the Japanese party — the Soviet Union, as an outcast 
country and an ‘abnormal‘ state, as considered by the world community, that is, the ‘West-
ern world‘.
In the last months of the Soviet Union, as supposed by S. Edamura, ‘the reforms initi-
ated by Gorbachev, left him behind’ [2, p. 197]. According to the Japanese diplomat, the 
referendum in Ukraine held on December 1, 1991, accelerated the collapse of the USSR. 
The Ambassador wrote that at that moment the Embassy sent to Tokyo a telegram with the 
following text: ‘The end of the Soviet Union as a state is close’ [2, p. 197]. He gave a chroni-
cle of events related to the legal registration of the USSR collapse in December 1991 and 
noted specifically the statement of resignation made by M. S. Gorbachev on December 25. 
The memoirs of S. Edamura declare that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable 
and, at the same time, it was a positive historical event. 
He wrote with great sympathy and compassion for the President of the USSR, who 
‘was prepossessed with grief, because many of his fellow citizens did not understand the 
value of his deeds and, in the end, he was betrayed. [ … ] We can probably say that the 
reforms initiated by Gorbachev ‘caught him up’ first and then left him behind’. However, I 
felt a great disposition towards Gorbachev — a charming, witty man’ [2, p. 199–200]. The 
opinion of S. Edamura in this quoted passage is a kind of quintessence of his attitude to the 
‘perestroika’, collapse of the USSR, and M. S. Gorbachev’s personality. This passage reflects 
the positive assessment of those reforms and emphasizes the importance of the last Soviet 
leader as a historical person. It is not intended to consider the role of M. S. Gorbachev and 
his policy in Russian research, but the way this policy is viewed from Japan, since it has not 
been revised until now. In the aggregate, the picture of events as described in S. Edamura’s 
memoirs reflects the most common ideas dispersed in Japanese public opinion, which 
indicate the rigidity of the above stereotypes about this critical stage of Russian history, as 
can be seen from both the literature reviewed by the author of this article, and interviews 
given by representatives of Japanese intellectual circles in 2017.
Sato Masaru: The Self-Destructing Empire
The work The Self-Destructing Empire is dedicated to the history of the USSR’s collapse. 
It was written by a diplomat, M. Sato, whose work in Moscow (1985–1991) is presented in 
the form of dialogues between the author and Russian and Japanese politicians and pub-
lic figures. The book describes in detail his encounters with representatives of the Soviet 
intellectual and political world; they shared their views and some information about the 
situation in the country, which was of interest to him as an intelligence officer [8, p. 54–57]. 
M. Sato makes a lot of interjections across the text of the book, explaining realities 
of the Soviet life that are obscure to the Japanese reader. Among others, a large place is 
occupied by the description of the work of the KGB (Committee for State Security), the 
FSU and GRU (Russia’s military intelligence service), which was observed personally by 
the Japanese diplomat during collection of information in Moscow [8, p. 45–49, 91–92]. 
According to the author’s logic, the strong pressure from these state structures became one 
of the factors contributing to the collapse of the country. 
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According to M. Sato, the main term of his study work, ‘self-destructing empire’ was 
borrowed from G. E. Burbulis, Russian politician who used it in a private conversation 
with the author in February 1993. During this informal meeting, the interlocutors dis-
cussed the reasons for the collapse of the USSR. G. E. Burbulis compared the USSR under 
M. S. Gorbachev with an atomic bomb that exploded on August 19, 1991. “He [Gorbachev] 
self-destroyed himself. The Soviet Empire self-destroyed itself. The coup attempted by 
GKChP in August 1991 became a political Chernobyl. The core, ‘the USSR Empire‘ and 
the nuclear reactor ‘CPSU’ caused melting of the core section and it exploded. Gorbachev 
is a waste. He only thought how to preserve the Communist state in the USSR. He mistak-
enly believed that during the reactor’s destruction at a defective power plant called ‘USSR’ 
some energy would remain. As a result, the state collapsed… The USSR was already col-
lapsing when Gorbachev came to power in 1985. My task was to help Yeltsin in under-
standing this situation. A new state — Russia — was able to emerge through clearing out 
the ruins of the USSR, but now it is facing difficulties’ [8, p. 374–375] (author’s translation 
from the Japanese). 
This reflection made M. Sato think about the history of Russia and the USSR, as well 
as the history of Japan. He compared the facts of the total collapse as experienced by these 
two countries in their history, the USSR and the Japanese Empire in 1945 [8, p. 17]. From 
his point of view, Russia was able to revive thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union, just 
as the national state of Japan was able to revive after the crushing defeat in the World War 
II and the hardships of the first post-war decade. This correlation is very controversial 
though indicative in the construction of identity and national historical memory of the 
Japanese people, and M. Sato’s analysis provides a representation of such approach.
M. Sato considers the Soviet Union an empire. This conviction was induced by the Sovi-
et dissident A. Kazakov when they discussed this problem in private in 1988. Following that 
conversation, M. Sato assimilated an idea that the USSR became an ‘empire without a suze-
rain state’, since the Soviet state represented an equitable union of all included ethnic com-
munities [8, p.]. 93]. At the same time, the colonies (i.e., the republics in M. Sato’s opinion), 
where the Russian ethnic element was not predominant (republics of the Baltic region and 
the Central Asia), were included in the USSR artificially, by the will of J. V. Stalin [8, p. 14]. 
M. Sato assumes that the diversity of countries and peoples of the USSR was united 
upon a single ideological basis — the Communist idea. He viewed scientific atheism, or 
Marxism-Leninism as a substitute religion in Soviet society [8, p. 49]. However, society 
started losing its spiritual background with the start of the country’s collapse. Republics 
were cemented by ideology and economy and were under the pressure of Central govern-
ment bodies and supervisory authorities (KGB). According to M. Sato, their foundations 
were undermined by substantial ethnic collisions, especially in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. However, the main interest of the Japanese diplomat (largely due to close commu-
nication with A. Kazakov) was focused on relations between Moscow and the three Baltic 
republics. According to M. Sato, they were to initiate the disintegration process, since the 
ideological linkage demonstrated its weakness by the late 1980s [8, p. 89–90]. 
The author paid special attention to the events that immediately preceded the USSR’s 
collapse between 1990 and 1991. According to M. Sato, conservative politicians (for ex-
ample, the publicist V. N. Shved, member of the Communist party of Lithuania Central 
Committee, joined Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) of Russia in the 1990s, retired in 
2004) evaluated negatively the prospects of the state collapse, while the opposition (most 
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of his informants at the time), on the contrary, considered these processes as a necessary 
course, since a ‘window of opportunity’ had emerged for them. During their encounter 
at a casino in the autumn 1990, the beginning of the USSR collapse was mentioned and 
V. N. Shved was rather pessimistic on the ongoing processes: ‘the USSR will become an 
American or German colony. We are in a casino right now, it was opened with Australian 
money. … The Union has become a hayfield for the Germans. We’ve lost Eastern Europe 
… this process can not be terminated. The Baltic, Ukraine, and Moldova will withdraw 
from the USSR. Japan has a great chance to get the Kuril Islands’ [8, p. 281–282] (author’s 
translation). 
The Japanese diplomat could clearly see the distribution of forces in the political 
life of the Soviet Union, namely, strengthening of the group of Democrats headed by 
B. N. Yeltsin. However, M. Sato highlighted the fact that the separation of politicians of 
the new wave was based on the old political platform and from the ranks of the CPSU 
members. Disagreements within the party had a serious impact on disintegration of the 
state. The role played by the strengthening of the Republican Communist parties with 
their own administrative structures was not negligible in these processes. According to 
M. Sato, advancement of the Communist party of the RSFSR (Russia) lead by B. N. Yelt-
sin in 1990 was of key importance [8, p. 327–330]. Here, M. Sato is inaccurate, as after 
the Politburo meeting in 1987, B. N. Yeltsin was in disfavor caused by his criticism of the 
excessively positive presentation of the results of ‘perestroika’ [9, p. 107–116]. His rise in 
1989–1990 was associated with his Deputy election. Apparently, M. Sato wished to sim-
plify the complex situation in the Soviet political life of that period for Japanese readers. 
He intended to show that the power of M. S. Gorbachev was rapidly falling by 1990 and 
conversely, the power of the future first President of Russia was at the rise, though this 
situation was not as straightforward as The Self-Destructing Empire purports. 
Both M. Sato and S. Edamura witnessed the August putsch of 19–21  August 1991. 
These events were described in the chapter ‘The fateful Morning’ and he viewed them as a 
turning point that led to the collapse of the USSR. In his opinion, despite the growing ten-
sion within the country, the happenings of August 1991 came as a surprise for him. Early 
in the morning, on August 19, he was called by Osanai Takashi, Consul of the Embassy, 
and was instructed from Tokyo to find out whether the President of the USSR M. S. Gor-
bachev was alive or dead. The Japanese diplomat and intelligence officer contacted many 
of his acquaintances in the USSR and they were sure that the head of the state had already 
been killed. It was then that M. Sato became famous in diplomatic circles for he was the 
first among the Western diplomats to communicate that M. S. Gorbachev was alive (this 
information was provided on August 20 by A. N. Ilyin, Second Secretary of the Commu-
nist Party of the RSFSR; S. Edamura does not mention this fact) [8, p. 364; 10, p. 161]. Dur-
ing these dramatic Moscow events in August 1991, M. Sato collected information through 
his numerous informants, both among Conservatives and Democrats. 
M. Sato described M. S. Gorbachev after his return from the Crimea on August 21 as 
exhausted and miserable. He wrote: ‘the peoples of the Soviet Union ceased to feel threat-
ened by him and displayed compassion’ [8, p. 372]. The Japanese diplomat assumes that 
the subsequent transition of the state power from M. S. Gorbachev to B. N. Yeltsin became 
the last chord in the internal self-destruction of the Soviet state [8, p. 373]. After the ban 
of the CPSU and the Communist party RSFSR signed by B. N. Yeltsin, the pro-communist 
opposers of M. S. Gorbachev lost the ideological basis of the ‘Empire of the USSR’ and 
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found themselves in the position of kamikaze, as they destroyed both themselves and their 
opponents [8, p. 375]. 
Notably, that M. Sato finds it appropriate to compare the events in Vilnius, January 
1991 and the Moscow events in August of the same year: he calls the barricades in the 
White House ‘toylike‘, as compared with those around the Supreme Council of Lithuania 
[8, p. 360]. In his opinion, people in Lithuania really struggled for their independence and 
separation from the USSR, while in Moscow there was a coup d’etat provoked by fights 
between the groups of politicians within the ruling élite. The fights for leadership between 
political forces within CPSU and the desire for independence in ‘artificially joined‘ repub-
lics presented a characteristic picture and, from M. Sato’s point of view, this was the way 
how the great Empire of the USSR collapsed. 
Later, in his study entitled ‘How to outlive the epoch of empires?’ M. Sato comple-
mented his theory of the USSR’s self-destruction with the postmodernist factor [11, p. 36]. 
The influence of postmodernism on the collapse of the Soviet Union implied that the So-
viet society started its disintegration from within, feeling the untruthfulness of the Marx-
ist postulates imposed by the state machine.
The narration of dramatic events related to the collapse of the USSR presented by 
M. Sato is of interest as eyewitness evidence. However, these interpretations should be 
taken carefully, bearing in mind his contacts with Soviet dissidents and Democrats of 
the early 1990s and their possible impact on his views. However, the former Japanese 
diplomat presented interesting materials that did not overlap with the text of S. Edamura, 
though both studies feature a similar overall ideology and critical attitude to the processes 
in the USSR. In this regard, the above-mentioned ideas about the gist of the transforma-
tion and collapse processes in the USSR can be considered dispersed in Japanese public 
opinion just because of their general recognition and platitudes. Moreover, the Japanese 
state policy towards the USSR and the Russian Federation in late 1991was shaped upon 
this analysis of the situation, when the stakes were placed on B. N. Yeltsin’s team and the 
RSFSR government, and further, in 1992, when, against the weakness of the newly estab-
lished Russian government, the Japanese government exerted an unprecedented pressure 
concerned with the ‘territorial issue’ on Russian president. Eventually this evolved into 
the crisis of bilateral relations in the autumn of 1992, in connection with the refusal of the 
President of Russia to pay a visit to Japan expressed a few days ahead of the scheduled date 
of the visit.
Conclusion
Several general conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed materials. First, both 
diplomats focused on the internal causes of the USSR’s collapse, following the American 
tradition of social, political and historical sciences. Both diplomats present the USSR as 
an empire, which reveals a conceptual consonance with the approaches taken by political 
scientists from the USA. Both rely on the idea about the inevitability of the USSR’s col-
lapse and the inevitable collapse of empires in general as was expressed by J. F. Kennan. 
Similar assessments of the situation in the economy, politics and ideology, interpreted as 
obsolete and failing to meet the needs of the modern world, are traced in the book Au-
topsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
by J. Matlock, the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR (1987–1991) and he considers socialism 
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to be doomed from the very beginning [2, p. 10, 546]. S. Edamura directly referred to 
the work of his American counterpart, which indicates the unity of views, traditions and 
assessments between American and Japanese scientists and diplomats. The same line is 
followed by Russian liberal-minded public figures and representatives of science (see, for 
example, E. T. Gaidar’s Collapse of an Empire, and the ‘History of Russian culture’ course of 
the Academy Arzamas online academy). 
The memoirs of M. Sato and S. Edamura had been written and published many years 
after the described events; therefore, both authors were well aware of the outcomes and 
consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Probably, years later this knowledge support-
ed their belief that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable. These ideas are found in the 
works of other Japanese diplomats–experts in Russian studies2 and specialists in Russian 
history (Simotomai Nobuo, Kimura Hiroshi, and others), which indicates that these ideas 
were anchored in Japanese social thought as a basic historical stereotype. 
Moreover, M. Sato and S. Edamura sympathize visibly with the ideologists of ‘pere-
stroika‘ and ‘new thinking’. They consider B. N. Yeltsin as an essential figure needed for 
the transformation of the USSR into the state adhering to Western values, which indicates 
that Japanese society gradually identifies itself as a Western society. In his book State, God 
and Marxism, M. Sato interpreted communism and Marxism as a religion [13, p. 287] and 
the loss of faith in Communist values led to the fall of the regime. The ideas of Japanese 
diplomats are in tune with the ideas formulated by F. Fukuyama, American sociologist and 
philosopher, in his famous work The End of History and the Last Man (1992). A special af-
finity related to the global-wide victory of liberal democracy is observed between Fukuy-
ama’s concepts and the opinions of Ambassador S. Edamura [2, p. 12; 14]. The memoirs of 
the latter can be seen as a vivid illustration of the concept of the American philosopher. 
Thus, we can assert that this book of memoirs not only and not so much reflects the events 
in the USSR in early 1990s, but rather draws an ideological conclusion on the acceptability 
of the Communist development model to a Japanese citizen. Such politicized and biased 
approaches in analyzing the history of our country reveal the orientation and values of 
Japanese ruling and intellectual elites with regard to the basic milestones of the Japanese 
society itself.
Japanese diplomats insisted that they ‘perceived‘ stagnation in the USSR while the 
emerging forces of ‘reformers‘ made a kind of live stream in these processes. Hence, they 
perceived positively the image of M. S. Gorbachev as launching ‘perestroika’ and ‘new 
thinking’ policies. This perception is still kept in Japan up to the present, as evidenced, for 
example, by the publication of another collection of Gorbachev’s interviews in 2015, and 
he is viewed in Japan as an authoritative expert on acute political issues of contemporary 
Russia [15].
It is obvious that the works discussed in this article focus on the problems of Soviet-
Japanese interactions. These books reveal the activities of Japanese diplomacy in prepar-
ing the ground for negotiations on the ‘territorial issue’. Consequently, the willingness to 
discuss this problem displayed by M. S. Gorbachev and B. N. Yeltsin’s team, in particular, 
is viewed by M. Sato and S. Edamura as one of the most positive movements in Soviet 
politics at the turn of the 1990s. The future directions of research presented in this article 
2 See the memoirs, journalistic and research works of Togo Kazuhiko, Tamba Minoru, and Kawato 
Akio — this vision is shown most brightly in his novel about Russia Beyond the Horizon — the Tale of Ilya 
(M., 2001).
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involve reviewing and performing a comparative and comprehensive analysis of the ideas 
and stereotypes already established and ‘dispersed’ in Japanese social thought in regard to 
the history of the fall of the USSR and the emergence of the Russian Federation, against 
the evaluation of these processes in the context of the evolution of Russo-Japanese dia-
logue from the point of view of its value orientation.
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Распад СССР глазами японских дипломатов Эдамура Сумио и Сато Масару
М. Н. Малашевская 
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9
Для цитирования: Malashevskaya M. N. The collapse of the USSR in the views of the third party: 
Analysis of memoirs of Japanese diplomats Edamura Sumio and Sato Masaru // Вестник Санкт-
Петербургского университета. Востоковедение и африканистика. 2018. Т. 10. Вып. 3. С. 292–
304. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu13.2018.301
Последние годы существования СССР и личность М. С. Горбачева привлекают внима-
ние отечественных историков, политологов, культурологов и многих других специали-
стов. Эта тема оказалась не менее интересной и для зарубежных авторов. В Японии 
«эпоха Горбачева» выделяется особо: президент СССР пользовался популярностью 
среди населения, его поддерживали в политических кругах благодаря запущенной им 
политике перестройки. В настоящее время в российской исторической науке и публи-
цистике происходит переосмысление периода заката Советского Союза. В  Японии 
в целом и в японской исторической науке в частности особым авторитетом пользуются 
публикации очевидцев тех событий, которыми стали два дипломата — Эдамура Сумио 
и Сато Масару, работавшие в конце 1980-х — начале 1990-х годов в посольстве Японии 
в Москве. Их работам и посвящена статья.
Ключевые слова: советско-японские отношения, М. С. Горбачев, перестройка, образ 
СССР в Японии, Сато Масару, Эдамура Сумио, саморазрушающаяся империя.
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